In Die Moral der Gesellschaft, Niklas Luhmann reinterprets morality from a systems-theoretical perspective. He contrasts his view with Émile Durkheim’s classical sociology, which regarded moral integration as a product of social interdependence. For Luhmann, this view no longer holds in modern societies, where functional differentiation—across subsystems like the economy, law, and politics—renders morality insufficient as a unifying force. Morality can no longer bind society as a whole.

 

Instead of prescribing behavior, norms in Luhmann’s framework generate expectations and, crucially, expectations about expectations. These form the operational foundation for communication in social systems. Sociology, therefore, should not adopt a normative stance but rather observe how moral communication functions. Morality, understood through the binary code of good versus bad, is not a reflection of objective truth but one specific mode of social coding that must be analyzed functionally. This perspective extends into Luhmann’s analysis of political and economic systems. While politicians are expected to act morally, politics as a function system operates through power and compromise, not ethical principles. It is structurally amoral, even if subject to external moral evaluation. Democracy, although often justified through moral rhetoric, is functionally sustained by formal procedures and the institutionalization of dissent—not by shared ethical values. In fact, moral overloading can endanger democratic stability.

 

Similarly, Luhmann is skeptical of "business ethics." The economy functions through the binary code of payment/non-payment and does not recognize moral distinctions like good and evil. Attempts to impose moral expectations can disrupt economic functionality, although ethical reflection may be useful at the intersection of different social systems.

Luhmann identifies three levels of social order—interaction, organization, and society—each with distinct roles for morality. In interactions, morality appears as personal judgment; in organizations, it becomes role-specific expectations; and at the level of society, it operates as generalized communication. He questions the notion of universal moral norms in pluralistic, functionally differentiated societies. Moral norms are always contingent, and modern society accommodates a wide range of moral perspectives. This structural pluralism makes moral consensus unlikely and unnecessary for societal cohesion.

 

Luhmann also critiques traditional ethical theory for failing to examine the systemic function of morality. Instead of moralizing morality, ethics should observe and reflect on moral communication as it occurs within systems. He defines ethics as a "second-order observation"—a reflection theory that acknowledges the limits and inherent risks of moral judgment in complex societies.

In today’s "risk society," moral communication increasingly addresses the evaluation and distribution of risks—such as those related to technology or the environment. The core issue becomes: who decides what risks are acceptable, and on what moral grounds? Luhmann warns that moralization itself introduces new risks, including the potential for social conflict, exclusion, and misplaced responsibility.

 

Ultimately, Luhmann argues that morality is not the foundation of society but a selective communication medium among many others. Its integrative power is limited in modernity, and its role must be examined in relation to other systemic codes. He rejects normative ethics in favor of a functional, observational understanding of how morality operates within complex social systems.

 

Source:

Luhmann, N. (2008), Die Moral der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.