In The Logic of Practice, Bourdieu begins with a quote from James Joyce to show how easy it is to be drawn in by rich patterns of meaning. He then argues that social science must constantly turn back on itself—real progress comes from reflecting on how we produce knowledge in the first place. The book revisits themes from Outline of a Theory of Practice and Distinction to deepen this reflexive project, linking theory back to the lived practices that inspired it rather than leaving it as abstract theory.

Claude Lévi-Strauss' structuralism introduced a relational way of thinking that looks at meaning through networks of relationships. Bourdieu follows it, but also warns that structuralism often hides its limits behind philosophical abstraction. His own fieldwork in Algeria during the independence war pushed him to combine scientific rigor with political and ethical awareness. He calls it a form of “militant craftsmanship” that treats research as both intellectually honest and socially responsible. In studying rituals, calendars, weaving, and domestic life, Bourdieu first tried to map symbolic systems through patterns of opposition—like wet/dry, male/female, night/day. But as he built diagrams to make sense of them, he found contradictions that no perfect model could capture. This realization led him to his central idea: what organises human action is not an explicit set of rules but the habitus: embodied dispositions and practical know-how that guide behavior without conscious reflection. From this came his central warning: models can help explain practices, but they don’t cause them. Treating theoretical schemes as the truth of practice misses the ambiguity and flexibility of real life. Rituals, for example, are meaningful because people do them, not because they carry one fixed symbolic code. Similarly, kinship and marriage are not just obedience to social norms but strategies through which people pursue both material and symbolic advantages. His later work in Béarn, France, reinforced this view (generalised materialism) that sees everyday practices as purposeful and interest-driven, even when they appear traditional or moral.

Bourdieu insists that researchers must also analyse their own position; the social distance, privilege, and habits that shape how they see others; to avoid false empathy or detached superiority. He shows that everyday thinking often works through binary contrasts, a kind of pre-logical reasoning that structures both ancient myths and modern politics.

In the end, The Logic of Practice makes a larger claim: true sociology is also a form of socio-analysis. It helps both scholars and ordinary people recognise how social structures influence their thoughts and actions and, through that awareness, opens the possibility of greater freedom and responsibility.