Tönnies, F. (1922), Kritik der öffentlichen Meinung, Berlin: Julius Springer.

In this book, Tönnies develops a theory of opinion (opining, believing, judging) and then shows how opinions become common, public, and politically/economically mobilized through communication, especially the press.

 

Opinion and opining

Opinion is primarily intellectual (akin to thinking, believing, conjecturing), but it is tied to feelings and wanting: we tend to think/opine out of desires and aversions, and our judgments carry an emotional yes/no stance. Having an opinion resembles having a will: once formed, it binds a person. It influences future thinking/decisions and also resists counter-ideas through memory (“what I really mean/want”). Hence courage of one’s opinion is praised, and forming one’s own opinion is treated as an achievement. Opinions are commonly judged as correct/false by comparing them to facts, yet Tönnies stresses that agreement about facts and meanings is limited: people interpret even shared statements differently, and language use varies.

 

Expression and control of opinions

Opinions themselves can’t be suppressed, but their expression and dissemination can be regulated (especially public propaganda/agitation). A publicly expressed opinion differs from a private one: it aims to impress, win recognition, succeed, and functions like a weapon in ideological struggle. Even when framed as purely intellectual, public opinion-expression typically rests on ideology and invites participation/solidarity, provoking tolerance or hostility depending on whether it aligns with the accepted view.

 

How common opinions arise

Shared opinions are less likely when (a) the topic is complex, (b) people’s interests/conditions differ, and (c) their talents/education/emotional states differ. Experts may still disagree on difficult subjects; meanwhile, many non-experts adopt views by authority; sometimes merely repeating them religiously, staying silent, or conforming to a group’s chorus. Group public opinion often becomes the opinion of recognized authorities, reinforced by repetition. Common opinions tend to track common conditions of existence: class, profession, property, security vs lack, and the basic divide between rulers and ruled, rich and poor, educated and uneducated. Conflicts over opinions often express conflicts of interests and classes. Large groups may agree more easily than educated individuals, whose differentiation, competitiveness, and pleasure in dissent produce “loners,” though these traits can also enable leadership.

 

Having an opinion vs expressing one

Tönnies distinguishes sharing an opinion from publicly representing one. Expression can be spontaneous (overflowing from conviction), but it can also be instrumental; done for a purpose without truly believing it. Opinion-expression can become commodified: bought, sold, coerced, traded (the clearest example given is buying/selling and, later, elections). In voting, many people may express opinions they didn’t form themselves; emotion simplifies choices into “good for us” vs “bad,” and masses can be steered.

 

Leadership and mass opinion

In crowds, especially on difficult issues, a few leaders can speak as if they speak for the masses: through authority, through voicing inarticulate needs, or by stirring emotions even when the content isn’t understood. This leadership of opinion can yield expressions that reflect little beyond mood (anger, hatred, revenge), potentially aimed at destruction.

 

Public opinion, communication, and struggle

Pictures, speech, and writing create audiences: gathered audiences respond loudly; dispersed readers are mostly silent, with limited feedback from a circle of readers. Opinion is energised by struggle: books, pamphlets, newspaper articles are treated as weapons. Conflicts can escalate from differences of ideas to personal/group hostility, insults, and even violence.

 

Community vs society: tradition vs information

• Community primarily transmits traditional opinions (beliefs, dogmas) across generations, often supported by authority (historically the clergy), mythic frameworks, and inherited ideals.
• Society (as the rationalising opposite) treats tradition as needing justification; individuals can instruct one another, and persuasion addresses the audience’s judgment with reasons and emotional appeals rather than authority “from above.”

 

Newspapers: news, markets, and persuasion

Newspapers thrive on fresh news, especially political news (war/peace, revolutions, elections, legislation) that feeds fear/hope and shapes long-term welfare, and business news (prices, markets, stocks) tied directly to profit and loss, and intertwined with politics. News distribution shifts from private messengers/letters to public mass dissemination, with the newspaper also becoming a marketplace for supply/demand (ads, services). News is frequently falsified by error and especially by intention (propaganda in war, manipulation in elections, and market/stock maneuvers using rumors and inventions). Finally, news is followed by discussion: editorials and commentary repeatedly colour interpretation, making the newspaper a tribune for shaping, feeding, converting, and organising opinion used by parties and governments (through censorship, corrections, or partisan papers).

 

Tönnies sharply distinguishes between public opinion, i.e. the many, diverse, conflicting opinions publicly expressed, and THE Public Opinion, i.e. a unified, authoritative social will, experienced as a single moral or political force. Public opinion is plural and fluid; the Public Opinion appears as a cohesive power that demands recognition and conformity. Tönnies compares this distinction to a parliament, where, during debate, opinions clash (like plural public opinions), and after a vote, the assembly speaks with one will (like the Public Opinion). Thus, the Public Opinion resembles the majority decision that stands as binding and representative of the whole, even if conflict preceded it.

 

Public Opinion exists in different degrees of solidity: solid, fluid, and air-like. Solid public opinion is stable, and consists of deep convictions (e.g., torture is barbaric). Fluid public opinion consists of contested, emotionally charged issues. Air-like public opinion is volatile opinion of the day, easily stirred by events or media. The press most strongly affects the air-like form, while more stable opinions arise from deeper intellectual or cultural foundations.

 

The press is a major organ of public opinion (plural), but not identical with the Public Opinion. Newspapers amplify and shape opinion, but do not create unified Public Opinion on their own.

Tönnies criticizes the modern press as a capitalist enterprise, driven by profit, influenced by advertisers and owners, and vulnerable to manipulation, sensationalism, hidden advertising, and political interests. He notes that newspapers may distort or suppress truth, serve economic or political power, and manufacture agitation. Yet even so, the press can’t fully control Public Opinion, but it interacts with it.

 

A partial opinion can grow into the Public Opinion when it aligns with broader moral developments,  a shocking event mobilizes sympathy, multiple influential voices converge, and opposition weakens.

This transformation often occurs through scandal, moral outrage, or political crisis.

 

Public life is structured by ongoing conflicts, e.g. government vs. opposition, conservative vs. reform movements, and orthodox vs. heterodox beliefs. Governments seek legitimacy not only through power but through winning Public Opinion. Even absolutist rulers tried to justify policies rationally to secure approval. Modern politics increasingly depends on influencing Public Opinion rather than suppressing dissent outright.

 

Public Opinion expresses itself through speech and oratory, writing (books, pamphlets, newspapers), art and drama, organisations and clubs, demonstrations and public meetings, festivals and ceremonies. These forms can be natural expressions of conviction or artificial tools of propaganda. Agitation often exaggerates opponents’ faults, conceals weaknesses, appeals emotionally rather than truthfully, and uses repetition to create belief.

 

Modern society increasingly uses technical and strategic methods to influence opinion: Organized propaganda, engineered demonstrations, media manipulation, strategic silence (“killing by silence”), and manufactured consensus. Capturing the Public Opinion becomes a central political objective.

 

Public Opinion functions similarly to religion, since it demands conformity, it brands dissent immoral, it condemns deviant opinions as dangerous or sinful, and it requires public expressions of loyalty. However, unlike religion, Public Opinion claims a scientific and rational aura and is tied to modern secular society.

 

Leaders op public opinion include clergy (earlier period), university professors, teachers, lawyers and political orators, doctors, writers and journalists, poets and artists. Writers and intellectuals play an especially decisive role in shaping modern Public Opinion. The Enlightenment is a key turning point, when literature and philosophy became politically powerful.

 

Public Opinion demands participation, e.g. subscribing to newspapers, attending meetings, supporting causes, and expressing loyalty publicly. Repeated expression can reshape internal belief. One may begin by outward conformity and end by inward conversion. Public Opinion often judges not by truth, but by usefulness and success; especially in war, where doubt may be condemned as disloyalty.

 

Tönnies conclusion is that Public Opinion is dynamic, conflict-driven, shaped by communication, strengthened through organisation, vulnerable to manipulation, similar to religion in its demand for conformity, yet distinctly modern and tied to rational, secular society. Above all, Tönnies shows that plural public opinions (noise and conflict) can condense into the Public Opinion (unified moral authority) and that this transformation is one of the central forces of modern political life.

 

Tönnies defines the Public Opinion as a specific form of societal social will, distinct from communal forms of will. He distinguishes between Community (organic will / Wesenswille), and Society (rational will / Kürwille). Community is about understanding and concord, tradition and custom, and faith and religion. These are rooted in shared feelings, inherited bonds, and lived unity.

Society is about contract and convention, norm and legislation, and doctrine and Public Opinion. Public Opinion is thus the advanced societal counterpart to religion. The difference is mainly that community forms grow organically from shared life, while societal forms are rationalised, deliberate, formalised, and written. Public Opinion is therefore a rationalised form of social will, primarily based on common thought, not common feeling. It’s a form of judgment, rather than command (legislation) or regulation (convention), which belongs to the ethical and spiritual sphere of modern social life.

 

Modern civilisation marks a shift from religion to Public Opinion, from custom to legislation, and from concord to convention. This transition reflects urbanization, trade and capitalism, science and rationalization, and expansion of education. As education spreads to women, workers, and rural populations, more groups participate in Public Opinion. However, the broader participation becomes, the less unified Public Opinion tends to be. If unity is achieved despite expansion, its power becomes immense.

 

Tönnies draws a deep structural parallel between community’s religion and society’s public opinion. Religion is faith-based, concerned about God’s command, conscience-focused, and about inner conviction. Public opinion is doctrine-based, moral judgment, appearance-focused public behaviour.

Religion judges the soul and inner belief, and demands moral purity. Public Opinion judges visible action, emphasises legality and conformity, and is often satisfied with appearances. It can be morally indulgent in economic matters as long as no scandal occurs. Both praise and condemn, shame and glorify, exercise social pressure, and act as moral authorities. Public Opinion becomes especially powerful when it takes on the form of Zeitgeist (spirit of the age), where doctrines harden into widespread conviction.

 

Public Opinion exists in three states: Air-like (ephemeral) as the volatile opinion of the day, liquid circulating doctrines gaining influence, and firm, stable convictions approaching religious authority.

The ephemeral form arises from and depends upon the more stable forms.

 

Ephemeral, air-like Public Opinion is (1) changeable since it quickly shifts from one topic to another, (2) hasty since it acts on first impressions, especially in urban environments, (3) superficial since it forms judgments without deep verification, (4) gullible since it easily accepts information that fits existing expectations, (5) prejudiced since it rooted in inherited beliefs absorbed early in life, (6) capricious yet persistent since it swings wildly but returns to its habitual positions, (7) personalizing since it’s more tenacious about personalities than issues and it idolises or demonises leaders, (8) emotionally driven since it’s often under the sway of excitement and agitation, (9) morally posturing since it always fights under the banner of morality, even when hypocritical, and (10) slogan-driven since it operates through emotionally charged words (e.g., freedom, equality, revenge) and these slogans function like flags in battle. Slogans crystallise dominant ideas, mobilise passion, often reflect shifts in power structures, can be used sincerely or manipulatively, and function similarly to religious symbols. The French Revolution’s freedom and equality exemplify this dynamic.

 

Public Opinion clings to words, confuses party, class, and national interests, often lacks political education, makes judgments without adequate knowledge, is easily offended or misled, and serious thinkers often struggle against it.

 

Public Opinion tends toward emotional politics concerned with honour, resistant to sacrifice, contradictory (anti-war yet unwilling to compromise). The rational statesman thinks strategically, pursues long-term advantage, may appear weak or cowardly to Public Opinion, and must manage and steer Public Opinion without destroying moral foundations. Statesmanship involves guiding or shaping Public Opinion, avoiding reckless manipulation, and recognizing the danger of weakening moral sentiment.

 

Tönnies concludes that the Public Opinion is a modern, rationalised moral authority, the societal successor to religion, a collective power of judgment, often emotional and volatile, yet capable of firm, enduring conviction, and influential in politics, morality, and social control. It demands conformity, operates through moral evaluation, and becomes especially powerful when stabilized into widely accepted doctrine.

 

Public Opinion is a modern historical force: it helped drive major transformations in church and state, law, justice, and administration. It expresses the spirit of modernity that gradually undermines traditional institutions and ideas. Paradox: everyday “public opinion of the day” is often conservative, instinctively defending tradition. Major reforms were typically advanced first by small minorities, outsiders, or rising classes, not by the mass of daily opinion.

 

Innovations (eventually) absorbed into Public Opinion include civil/legal reforms (e.g., against torture, witch trials, secret proceedings; for juries and open testimony), economic-liberal reforms (free trade, free markets, freedom of association), constitutional and electoral reforms (constitutions, voting rights expansions), and later, social reforms that limit free contracts and property rights (proto-socialist legal constraints). Religion is the most consistent rallying point of resistance, because it is structurally conservative and often holds the daily mood in place.

 

Change happens when innovators conquer Public Opinion through prophets/leaders and apostles, through persuasion, repetition, organisation, and sometimes through opportunists who back new ideas for self-interest. Big shocks can cause sudden shifts, but every revolution installs a new Public Opinion that becomes the next castle to defend.

 

The Public Opinion is a Political Factor in the State. Public Opinion becomes an institution; its power becomes solid fact once governments and commentators treat it like a real governing constraint; almost like a parallel institution next to parliament. It’s discussed alongside the press, but the press is treated as the most important organ of Public Opinion, not identical with it. Public Opinion is expressed via many channels: press, conversation, assemblies, clubs, petitions, demonstrations, literature, theater, etc. Some writers describe a triad: parliament + press + public opinion, with Public Opinion ultimately decisive when it becomes unified.

 

U.S. Public Opinion is not fundamentally different from elsewhere: it reflects the socially relevant classes, especially education and property, but in America the weight tilts more strongly toward property. It’s broad yet exclusionary: people of color and many immigrants are outside its effective circle; others are treated as second-tier. Wartime labeling of hyphenated Americans shows this boundary-making. It remains culturally Puritan in tone (public piety) but secular in substance; practical Enlightenment rationality aimed at external success. It admires wealth and success, moralises against ruthless methods, yet is easily impressed by results and can slip into worship of the successful. It equates freedom largely with commercial freedom, tends toward contempt for the state, and celebrates technological progress without the European culture vs civilisation distinction.

It becomes liquid when corruption and concentrated financial power become too visible; reform ideas (e.g., Henry George + European socialist currents) begin to erode complacency. A stabiliser is near-unanimous belief in republicanism and democracy: even class conflict doesn’t break that shared framework, which makes elite dominance more secure than in monarchies. Tönnies stresses U.S. citizenship identity and weak class stratification among whites but stronger racial stratification, plus continued cultural dependence on England via language and elite education.

 

Public Opinion’s growth is tied to the future of culture: its power will increase and be pushed and reshaped from below. Christianity’s public power declines as Public Opinion rises. Protestant contexts (England/U.S.) are portrayed as more compatible with Public Opinion than Catholicism, but the long-run trend is continued erosion of Christian authority. Tönnies rejects the simple claim “less religion = less morality”, because Public Opinion often values religiosity as moral seriousness / idealism, even when belief-content fades but war and hypocrisy showed how weak the religion–ethics link can become in practice.

 

Two possible futures are (1) revolutionary rupture: a deeper crisis than the Reformation and destruction of old religious forms could shake society profoundly, and (2) transformation into a new religiosity: Public Opinion could evolve into a universal religion of humanity (a Holy Ghost religion): not dogma, but ethical spiritual consciousness aimed at refining humankind. A major condition is the moral reform of economic life: reducing the power of capital within Public Opinion and elevating labor as a co-determining force. Public Opinion hesitates to endorse socialism and recoils from communism, preferring community (e.g., Volksgemeinschaft as wartime experience).

 

The practical moral program Tönnies highlights is reformist and hygienic: labour protections, land/housing reform, cooperatives to heal capitalism from within, public health campaigns (alcoholism, venereal disease, tuberculosis), and strong family life as the moral core that education can’t replace, only protect. Because Public Opinion is tightly bound to the daily press, its future depends on press reform. Tönnies revisits critiques of journalism and ends with an illustrative proposal (Ferdinand Hansen): creating independent newspapers insulated from advertising pressure, with high editorial standards, broad access for parties, and independent news infrastructure. Tönnies doubts such schemes will be realised fully, but treats them as a serious critique and argues the most plausible route is reform from within by the best journalists; helped by public pressure, which would also educate Public Opinion itself.